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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






MELVIN OMAR PAIZ-CABRERA, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
        Respondent 
 __________________________________ 
 
On a Petition For Review of an Order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A099-940-431) 
Immigration Judge: Charles M. Honeyman 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 8, 2012 
 
Before: SCIRICA, CHAGARES and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 20, 2012) 
____________ 
 




 Melvin Omar Paiz-Cabrera (“Paiz”) petitions for review of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ final order of removal.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny 
the petition for review. 
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Paiz, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the United States without being 
admitted or paroled.  Paiz claimed that he crossed the border at Nogales, Arizona in late 
1992, when he was 14 years old.  On August 1, 2007, Paiz was placed in removal 
proceedings pursuant to a Notice to Appear.  It is undisputed that Paiz is removable under 
Immigration & Nationality Act (“INA”) § 212(a)(6)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  
At a hearing before the Immigration Judge on February 20, 2008, Paiz applied for 
cancellation of removal for certain non-permanent residents, INA § 240A(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1).  The application was based on a claim that his removal would result in 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his then fifteen month-old daughter, Alba.   
 In November 2008, Paiz married Cristina Estevez, a United States citizen and the 
mother of his four year-old son Frankie.  In that same month, Estevez filed a Form I-130 
Petition for Alien Relative on Paiz’s behalf with the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (“USCIS”).  At a hearing on December 4, 2008 before the IJ, Paiz, 
with the assistance of counsel, agreed to withdraw his application for cancellation of 
removal in favor of awaiting the outcome of the immediate relative petition filed by his 
wife.  This was done with the understanding that Paiz would be granted 120 days in 
which to voluntarily depart following the approval of the petition.
1
  Paiz agreed to 
withdrawal after the IJ advised him that the cancellation of removal application was 
unlikely to succeed because he could not show exceptional and extremely unusual 
hardship to a qualifying relative.  With Paiz’s agreement, the IJ approved the withdrawal 
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 The plan was for Paiz to voluntarily depart and then pursue consular processing for his 
adjustment of status application. 
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of the cancellation of removal application with prejudice, and agreed to continue 
proceedings until such time as the visa petition was approved.  No voluntary departure 
order was issued, and the hearing was continued for six months.  Thereafter, the IJ 
granted three more continuances to Paiz in accordance with the negotiated agreement. 
 On July 7, 2010, the USCIS approved the immediate relative petition.  On August 
19, 2010, son Melvin was born to the couple.  In September 2010, Paiz directed his 
counsel to seek reinstatement of the application for cancellation of removal.  Counsel 
filed the necessary motion, in which Paiz contended that he now qualified for 
cancellation of removal because he has three children instead of two, and because his 
wife was suffering from depression.  He stated that he preferred to pursue cancellation of 
removal rather than the original plan, which would have required him to depart the 
United States, and await the uncertainties of consular processing.  Paiz attached 
documentary evidence to his motion to reinstate, including a certificate of birth for his 
youngest child and a one-page letter, dated June 28, 2010, from a behavioral services 
clinic, in which it was stated that Estevez suffered from a “Major Depressive 
Disorder/anxiety disorder,” A.R. 158, and was deeply depressed and panicky due to her 
husband’s immigration problems.  The Department of Homeland Security opposed the 
motion to reinstate. 
 On December 21, 2010, the IJ denied the request to reinstate the application for 
cancellation of removal and ordered Paiz removed to Guatemala.  In denying 
reinstatement, the IJ reasoned that: (1) the cancellation of removal application was 
withdrawn with prejudice, and the withdrawal was voluntary and with the advice of 
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counsel; (2) continuances had been generously granted over a two-year period while Paiz 
awaited the approval of the immediate relative petition; (3) the original plan was 
favorable to Paiz in that it would have reduced the amount of overseas visa processing 
time; (4) there had been no intervening and favorable changes in the law; (5) the 2008 
assessment of Paiz’s chances of showing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a 
qualifying relative had not been incorrect; and (6) the medical documentation of his 
wife’s depression was limited.  Paiz appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, 
arguing that his new evidence should have been considered on the merits, and, had it 
been considered, it would have entitled him to cancellation of removal and thus provided 
a basis for reinstatement. 
 On May 26, 2011, the Board dismissed the appeal.  The Board agreed with the IJ 
that Paiz had a fair opportunity to present his case, reasoning that it was undisputed that 
Paiz had voluntarily withdrawn his original application for cancellation of removal with 
prejudice, and that the IJ had granted him numerous continuances to await the approval 
of the immediate relative petition.  Noting that the IJ has the authority to narrow issues 
and obtain stipulations, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.21(a), the Board further reasoned that Paiz 
withdrew his cancellation of removal application “as a strategic option to await 
adjudication of his I-130 [petition] and to seek consular processing after voluntarily 
departing.”  A.R. 4.  With respect to the merits of his renewed cancellation of removal 
argument, the Board concluded that the IJ had fully considered the new evidence.  The 
Board then agreed with the IJ that Paiz’s new evidence would likely not meet the 
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative test, see generally 
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Matter of Rajah, 25 I. & N. Dec. 127, 136 (BIA 2009) (an inquiry for a continuance 
should focus on the likelihood of success of the application for relief).  Paiz’s evidence of 
his wife’s psychological problems was indeed limited.  There was no psychological 
report or witness proffer to explain the one-page document.  Moreover, Paiz did not 
contend that his third child had any health or developmental problems. 
 Paiz has timely petitioned for review of the Board’s decision.  We have 
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (b)(1), and previously denied him a stay of 
removal.  In his brief, Paiz argues that the agency’s decision refusing reinstatement was 
not in keeping with the spirit of  Dada v. Mukasey, 554 U.S. 1 (2008) (alien may 
withdraw voluntary departure request as long as request is made within the voluntary 
departure period).  The Department of Homeland Security has argued that Dada is 
inapposite because Paiz was never granted voluntary departure, and that, in any event, the 
original negotiated agreement was fair to Paiz, and his new evidence is simply the result 
of his continued presence in the United States.  Further, there are strong policy reasons 
for, in essence, enforcing the original agreement, including discouraging dilatory 
conduct, ensuring finality, and resolving claims in a non-adversarial fashion.  
 We will deny the petition for review.  We review the agency’s decision denying a 
motion to reinstate for an abuse of discretion.  Cf. Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 404 
(3d Cir. 2005) (concerning motions to reopen).  We will disturb the Board’s denial of 
such a motion only if it arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 
F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004).  We conclude that the agency did not act arbitrarily, 
irrationally, or contrary to law in refusing to reinstate Paiz’s cancellation of removal 
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application and in refusing to further continue the proceedings.  With the advice of 
counsel, Paiz voluntarily withdrew his original application for cancellation of removal 
with prejudice.  The original negotiated agreement was fair to Paiz.  Moreover, the IJ 
granted him numerous continuances to await the approval of the immediate relative 
petition.  Paiz’s reliance upon Dada, 554 U.S. 1, is misplaced.  Dada holds only that an 
alien may withdraw a voluntary departure request as long as the request is made within 
the voluntary departure period.  Paiz was never granted voluntary departure.   
We further agree with the Board that the IJ fully considered Paiz’s new evidence, 
and we see no arbitrariness in the Board’s observation that the new evidence was limited.  
As the Board itself noted in citing Matter of Rajah, an inquiry for a continuance should 
focus on the likelihood of success of the application for relief, but, here, Paiz was asking 
for more than a continuance.  He was asking to reinstate his application after agreeing to 
withdraw it with prejudice, and after reaping the benefit of the agreement, which was to 
remain in the United States while awaiting the approval of the immediate relative 
petition.  There are, as the Department of Homeland Security has argued, strong policy 
reasons for enforcing a scrupulously fair agreement of the kind entered into here between 
the agency and Paiz. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  The Court by this 
Opinion does not preclude the Respondent from granting administrative relief to 
Petitioner if he seeks the same but the Court expresses no opinion on whether such relief 
should be granted. 
